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 1  
I. INTRODUCTION 
“To ‘touch upon’ a loss is not to cause a loss, and it is the latter that the law requires.”1 
In February of 2014, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Loos v. Immersion 
Corp.,2  that under a securities fraud claim, “the announcement of an investigation, standing 
alone, is insufficient to establish loss causation.”3  The court followed in line with several other 
circuit courts, which have denied a cause of action to plaintiffs who do not support their claim 
with greater evidence than a drop in stock price and the subsequent announcement of an internal 
or external investigation.  This article will consider the relevant case history leading up to Loos, 
as well as why the Ninth Circuit came to an incorrect conclusion given the purpose of securities 
fraud claims.   
As will later be revealed, most of the circuits  (including the Ninth Circuit after Loos) 
recently interpreted the securities fraud statute as having strict loss causation requirements.4  This 
interpretation results from a history of frivolous securities fraud claims in an attempt to win 
settlement money from corporations.  The strict standard adopted by Loos and other courts is an 
overreaction to the threat of frivolous claims.  An investigation and a relating stock price 
decrease should be enough to fulfill the loss causation requirement at the pleading stage of a 
securities fraud claim. 
Part II of this note will describe the history of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934’s 
Rule 10(b) and the relevant cases that provide the foundation for the Loos decision.  This section 
will also explain the circuit split regarding whether an investigation is enough to plead loss 
causation and provide a description of the facts leading up to the Loos decision, including the 
                                                 
1 Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 1632 (2005). 
2 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17813 (9th Cir. 2014) 
3 Loos v. Immersion Corp., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17813 at *2-3 (9th Cir. 2014) (hereinafter short name referred to 
as “Loos”).  
4 Cite either the circuit court cases as examples or cite the portion of your article where this is described, or both.  
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relevant factual findings of the district court that were conceded by the appellate court.   Part III 
will analyze the Ninth Circuit’s decision and its impact on the law of securities fraud.  This 
section will compare the Loos analysis with the approach adopted by other courts. Part IV will 
summarize the main arguments within the circuit split and propose a more equitable solution. 
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK & BACKGROUND 
A. Background on Loos: Immersion Corp. Stock Dip and Investigation 
Despite a drop in stock price and the announcement of an internal investigation, the Ninth 
Circuit in Loos held that the plaintiffs did not adequately plead the loss causation requirement of 
the federal securities fraud statute.  Immersion Corporation (“Immersion”) is publicly traded on 
the NASDAQ stock exchange. 5   The company develops and licenses “haptics” technology, 
which creates tactile feedback for handheld and medical electronic devices. 6. In late 2009, John 
Loos and other investors, 7  filed a class action against Immersion in the Northern District of 
California for “violations of Sections 10(b), 20(a) and 20A of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission's implement ing regulations.”8  
The company and five of its executives were named as defendants.9  
The District Court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to adequately 
plead scienter and loss causation. 10   But the court granted Plaintiffs’ leave to amend. The 
Plaintiffs then amended the complaint, with the same causes of action.11  The district court again 
                                                 
5 Id. at *3-4. 
6 Id. Specifically, the technology creates a “pulse” when a button is pressed on the screen of a device. Id.  
7 Cite to complaint. (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Plaintiffs”).  
8 Id.  
9 Id. (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Defendants”).  
10 Loos v. Immersion Corp., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17813 at *4-5 (9th Cir. 2014). 
11 Id. 
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granted the Defendants’ second motion to dismiss for failure to meet the previous deficiencies.12  
The Plaintiffs then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.13 
From the beginning of Immersion’s public offering in 1999, until the end of 2006, the 
company was not profitable.14  Immersion reported its first profitable quarter in the first quarter 
of 2007 (“1Q07”) after receiving a $150 million settlement in a patent infringement claim. 15  In 
an attempt to satisfy shareholders, the company disclosed that it would invest the funds in growth 
initiatives to insure profitable quarters in the future.16  In its 2Q07 disclosure and press release, 
Victor Viegas, Immersion’s CEO and a named defendant in Loos, claimed that the company had 
two successful quarters in a row due to strong sales in the Medical Division.17  He also indicated 
that revenue grew 19% in 2Q06 and expected further growth through international sales in 
China.18  
In the 3Q07 press release, Viegas noted another profitable quarter and claimed revenue 
grew 39% over 3Q06.19  Immersion again boasted profitability in 4Q07.20  However, in 2Q08, 
the company announced a net loss of $3.1 million. 21   Immersion attempted to highlight the 
growth in revenues in 2007.22   Nonetheless, the company reported a loss of $4.3 million in 
3Q08.23   The company continued to focus on revenue growth, which exceeded $10 million 
                                                 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Loos, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS at *5. 
15 Id. 
16 Loos v. Immersion Corp., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17813 at *6 (9th Cir. 2014). 
17 Loos, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS at *6-7. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Loos v. Immersion Corp., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17813 at *7-9 (9th Cir. 2014). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
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quarterly.24  The company reported a $7.1 million loss in 4Q08 and a $7.5 million loss in 1Q09.25  
Finally, the company admitted a decrease in revenues.26 
On July 1, 2009, Immersion announced that the Audit Committee of the Board of 
Directors would be conducting an internal investigation into previous revenue transactions in its 
Medical division.27  The company’s shares proceeded to drop 23% that day.28  On August 10, 
2009, Immersion advised investors not to rely on its prior financial statements.29 
In its amended Form 10-K/A filed with the SEC, the company admitted to errors in 
recording revenue and recognizing sales prematurely, violating generally accepted accounting 
principles (“GAAP”) regarding three types of orders: (1) a “side agreement” with Chinese 
customers for unauthorized shipping and payment terms; (2) products that were either 
unavailable or not fully in the development stage at the time of sale; and (3) orders not delivered 
in time, contained non-standard terms, or “lacked probable collectability.”30  As a result of these 
errors, Immersion restated its earnings for 2006, 2007, 2008 and 1Q09. 31  The most significant 
impact of the restatement was on fiscal year 2008, in which Immersion reversed $623,000 in 
medical sales revenue and deferred another $3 million to later periods. 32 Although these figures 
might lead a reasonable person to infer that Immersion Corp.’s fraudulent conduct caused the 
investors’ financial injuries, the court held otherwise.33 
B. A Brief and Relevant History of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 
  
                                                 
24 Id. 
25 Loos v. Immersion Corp., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17813 at *9 (9th Cir. 2014). 
26 Id. 
27 Loos, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS at *9-10. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Loos v. Immersion Corp., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17813 at *10-11 (9th Cir. 2014). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Loos, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS at *2-3. 
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1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5 
Due to the Great Depression and market crash of October 1929, political pressure for 
securities regulation resulted in the Federal Securities Act of 1933. 34  The 1933 Act regulates 
public offerings and the sale of securities in interstate commerce. 35   The Act emphasizes 
disclosure and is influenced by the philosophy of Justice Brandeis: “Sunlight is said to  be the 
best of disinfectants: electric light the most efficient policeman.” 36   The 1933 Act is 
complemented by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which acts as the enforcement 
mechanism to the mandates of the 1933 Act.37 The Exchange Act is essentially “a laundry list of 
problems for which Congress articulated neither the means nor the end objective.”38 The 1934 
Act establishes the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and delegates authority to the 
SEC to deal with securities issues. 39   While the Securities Act is concerned with the initial 
distribution of securities to investors, the Exchange Act focuses on trading markets and the 
parties involved in these markets, requiring continuous disclosure by participants.40 
The primary tool for enforcing the proper distribution of information to investors is Rule 
10b-5, authorized under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. 41 The Rule was adopted in 
1942 pursuant to the SEC’s authority to proscribe rules to prevent decept ive practices in 
connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 42 The scope of the Rule is meant to be broad 
and covers conduct by any corporation “so long as the misconduct is intentional and truly 
                                                 
34 COX, HILLMAN & LANGEVOORT , SEC. REG. CASES AND MATERIALS § 1[B][1][a] 5 (7th ed. 2013). 
35 Id. 
36 Id (citing L.D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 62 (1914)). 
37 Id at § 1[B][1][b] 8. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id at 9, 10. 
41 Id at § 13 695. 
42 Id. 
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deceptive in nature.”43 Enforceable both publicly and as a private right of action, the Rule is the 
central antifraud provision of the federal securities laws.44 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 makes it unlawful to “use or 
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection 
of investors."45  Additionally, SEC Rule 10b-5 (implementing § 10(b)) prohibits the following 
“in connection with the purchase or sale of any security”: 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or  
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate 
as a fraud or deceit upon any person[.]46 
There are six elements to securities fraud claim pursuant to §10(b) and Rule 10b-5: 
1. A material misrepresentation or omission; 
2. Scienter (i.e. a wrongful state of mind); 
3. A connection between the misrepresentation and the purchase or sale of a security; 
4. Reliance upon the misrepresentation (in “fraud-on-the-market” cases, presumption 
that price of stock reflects all public information) 
5. Economic loss; and 
                                                 
43 Id at § 13 696. 
44 Id. 
45 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
46 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5. 
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6. Loss causation.47  
The sixth element, loss causation, is defined as the “causal relationship between a material 
misrepresentation and the economic loss suffered by an investor.”48   Loss causation can be 
established by a revelation of fraudulent activity.49  Plaintiffs commonly establish loss causation 
by showing the following: 
(1) identifying a ‘corrective disclosure’ (a release of information that 
reveals to the market the pertinent truth that was previously concealed or 
obscured by the company’s fraud); (2) showing that the stock price 
dropped soon after the correct disclosure; and (3) eliminating other 
possible explanations for this price drop, so that the factfinder can infer 
that it is more probable than not that it was the corrective disclosure—as 
opposed to other possible depressive factors—that caused at least a 
‘substantial’ amount of the price drop.50 
The Fifth Circuit has a different threshold for establishing loss causation, called 
materialization of the risk .51   The plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s fraud caused a 
material risk to go undisclosed.52  If the misrepresentation “touches upon the reasons for the 
investment’s decline in value” then the plaintiff can prove loss causation.53  
 One might inquire as to the purpose of the loss causation requirement, given that 
economic loss must be fulfilled in any case.  The intent of the loss causation requirement is to 
                                                 
47 Citation needed. 
48 Loos, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17813 at *13 (citing Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342, 125 
S. Ct. 1627, 161 L. Ed. 2d 577 (2005)).   
49 Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008). 
50 Jonathan N. Eisenberg, Litigating Securities Class Actions § 2.06 (Matthew Bender) (quoting FindWhat Investor 
Group v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1311 n.38 (11th Cir. 2011)). 
51 Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 820-21 (2009). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
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prevent Section 10(b) from becoming “an insurance plan for the cost of every security purchased 
in reliance upon a material misstatement or omission.”54  Valuation in securities litigation is 
highly complicated and often speculative.55  Stock prices are considered “a dynamic, not a static, 
concept and the market may re-evaluate and re-price a stock on a daily, hourly or even 
momentary basis."56  An expert’s opinion may be influenced by subsequent stock prices. 57  This 
is particularly likely when the price drop occurs immediately following a disclosure of allegedly 
fraudulent conduct. 58   Thus, one scholar speculates that loss causation solves an evidentiary 
problem.59   
Contrary to its nomenclature, loss causation in securities fraud is not based on tort 
principles and did not originally appear in the text of the statute.60  The courts previously used 
“federal common law” to define a securities fraud claim.61  The elements of the claim are mainly 
judge-made law.62  Early securities fraud litigation focused on the reliance element in order to 
establish a sufficient nexus between the fraud and purchase of the security.63  The loss causation 
requirement was not codified until 1995.64 Loss causation became an element of a securities 
fraud claim when Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) in 
                                                 
54 William E. Knepper & Dan A. Bailey, Liability of Corporate Officers and Directors, § 13.05 (8th ed. 2011) 
(quoting Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. 1981), rev’d in part on other grounds, 459 
U.S. 375 (1983)). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 845-46 (2009). 
60 Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 820-21 (2009). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Ann Morales Olazabal, Loss Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Cases Post Dura Pharmaceuticals, 3 BERKELEY 
BUS. L.J. 337, 343 (2006). 
64 Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 820-21 (2009). 
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1995.65  In an effort to curb frivolous securities fraud claims, the PSLRA required pleading with 
particularity. 66 
Some courts analogize loss causation to proximate cause and look to whether the loss 
suffered was a foreseeable result of the fraud. 67  Other courts place the burden on the defendant 
to “sever” the link between the misrepresentation and the price drop or leave causation up to the 
jury.68   
The problem with the courts’ use of causation in securities cases: the courts are relying 
on negligence principles while securities fraud is an intentional tort. 69   Causation is used in 
negligence cases as a “process of logical determination” for deciding whether the plaintiff’s 
injuries were too attenuated from the defendant’s actions. 70   In intentional tort cases, the 
causation requirement is usually easier to fulfill since it is assumed that there is a close link, both 
temporally and conceptually, between the wrongful conduct and the harm.71  Courts also see the 
defendant as blameworthy and are less concerned with the scope of harm.72  There is also little 
“risk of inefficient overdeterrence” for imposing liability for intentional torts. 73   Thus, the 
purpose of loss causation is to take focus away from the harm itself.  For example: it is irrational 
to hold a lying executive during a rising stock market accountable while an executive who 
commits fraud just before a stock market crash escapes liability.74  
                                                 
65 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, § 101(b), 109 Stat. 737 (1996). 
66 Id. at § 105. 
67 Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 821 (2009). 
68 Id. at 826-27. 
69 Id. at 840. 
7021-101 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS, DEFENSES, DAMAGES § 101.6 (Matthew Bender Rev. 
Ed.) [3][a] n. 50 (citing Norwood v. City of New York, 95 Misc. 2d 55, 406 N.Y.S. 2d 256 (Civ. Ct. Queens County 
1978)). 
71 Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 832 (2009).. 
72 Id. 
73 Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 832 (2009). 
74 Id. at 840. 
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2. Supreme Court Case Law 
a. Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo 
 In Dura Pharmaceuticals, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff cannot satisfy the loss 
causation requirement for securities fraud by merely alleging that the price of the security at the 
date of purchase was inflated due to a misrepresentation. 75   The plaintiffs in Dura 
Pharmaceuticals76 claimed that the company made false statements regarding the profitability of 
its prospective asthmatic spray device. 77   Although the price of the shares fell, it ultimately 
recovered within one week.78 
The Dura Pharmaceuticals Court set down the basic elements of the securities fraud 
statute: “Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 forbids[:] (1) the use or 
employ[ment] . . . of any . . . deceptive device, (2) in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security, and (3) in contravention of Securities and Exchange Commission rules and 
regulations.”79  The Court also defined securities fraud as “among other things, the making of 
any untrue statement of a material fact or the omission of any material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made . . . not misleading."80  Dura Pharmaceuticals noted that the courts 
have implied a private damages action from these statutes, which is similar to “common- law tort 
actions for deceit and misrepresentation.”81 
According to the Court, for publicly traded securities, a cause of action requires (1) a 
material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter; (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of 
                                                 
75 Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 338, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 1629 (2005). 
76 Id. at 339 (plaintiffs included investors in the stock of Dura Pharmaceuticals  Corp.).  
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Dura, 125 S.Ct. at 1630-31 (2005)(citing 15 USC § 78j(b))(internal quotation marks omitted). 
80 Id. (citing 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (2004))(internal quotation marks omitted). 
81 Id. The right to private damages from an act of securities fraud holds a similar function to common law tort.  
However, as mentioned earlier (n. 60, 61), the private right of action for securities fraud is based on judge -made law, 
which focused on reliance rather than causation. 
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a security; (4) reliance; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.82 Additionally, “[a]n inflated 
purchase price will not itself constitute or proximately cause the relevant economic loss.”83 The 
plaintiff cannot suffer a loss at the instant that the transaction takes place since the price of the 
share at that moment allegedly represents its value.84 The reselling of shares at a lower price may 
represent economic circumstances rather than some form of misrepresentation by the company.85 
Ultimately, the court held that the plaintiff did not sufficiently establish loss causation by 
merely stating that a misrepresentation led to an inflated purchase price. 86 Unfortunately, Dura 
still leaves considerable room for interpretation.  In general, plaintiffs may be able to recover 
without a drop in stock price, a defendant company may be able to prevent recovery by plaintiffs 
by disclosing unrelated negative information ahead of the actual fraud, and there is no 
determination as to whether Dura applies to investors involved in multiple transactions. 87 
Nonetheless, Dura establishes that loss causation is the key element and “gatekeeping 
mechanism” for private securities fraud claims.88  
Dura is often credited as an attack on “abusive practices” in securities fraud cases.89  
Plaintiffs continued to bring securities fraud cases to court because they were so expensive to 
litigate that they were often settled for large sums. 90  This created an incentive to initiate even 
frivolous lawsuits in the hopes of receiving a settlement. 91  Professor Kaufman argues that, rather 
                                                 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 338, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 1630-31 (2005). An inconsistency is possible 
here, in that although market price supposedly represents the value of a security, if fraud already occurred, then we 
could not say with certainty that the price is an adequate determination of the security’s  value. 
85 Id. at 1632. 
86 Id. 
87 Fisch, Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud at 825. 
88 Id. 
89 Michael J. Kaufman, At a Loss: Congress, The Supreme Court and Causation Under the Federal Securities Laws, 
2 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1, 13 (2005). 
90 Citation needed. 
91 Citation needed. 
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than create an onerous causation standard, the heightened pleading and sanctions standards of the 
statute should deter frivolous suits.92 
Although the Supreme Court attempted to resolve a circuit split in Dura, the case left a 
considerable number of unanswered questions. For instance, the Court did not evaluate whether 
loss causation must be pled with particularity, as is the requirement for the scienter element.93  
The Court only recognized that a short, plain statement of the loss causation is required. 94 Dura 
also did not address corrective disclosures and what types of disclosures would be sufficient to 
establish loss causation.95 
C. Circuit Split 
1. Meyer v. Greene (11th Circuit) 
In Meyer, the plaintiffs, participants in The City of Southfield Fire & Police Retirement 
System, appealed after the dismissal of their class-action securities fraud complaint again the St. 
Joe Company and its officers for violating §10(b). 96 St. Joe was a publicly-traded real estate 
development corporation.97 Once the market crashed in 2008, the company’s holdings declined 
and it halted many of its projects.98 The investors claimed that St. Joe failed to disclose the 
declining value of its assets in its quarterly and annual SEC reports.99   
On October 13th, 2010, a hedge-fund investor, David Einhorn, made a presentation, 
which involved a discussion of St. Joe’s assets. 100   He claimed the assets were significantly 
                                                 
92 Michael J. Kaufman, At a Loss: Congress, The Supreme Court and Causation Under the Federal Securities Laws, 
2 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1, 13 (2005). 
93 William E. Knepper & Dan A. Bailey, Liability of Corporate Officers and Directors, § 13.05 (8th ed. 2011). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Meyer v. Greene, 710 F.3d 1189, 1192 (11th Cir. 2013). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Meyer v. Greene, 710 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 2013). 
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overvalued and that their decrease in value should be disclosed.101  In the following two days of 
trading, St. Joe’s stock dropped 20%.102 Accordingly, investors filed a complaint on November 
3, 2010, based on the drop in share price.103  The district court dismissed the complaint for, 
among other reasons, failing to adequately plead loss causation.104 
On January 10, 2011, St. Joe’s disclosed the initiation of the SEC’s informal investigation 
into the company’s impairment of real estate assets.105 An order of private investigation by the 
SEC followed on July 1, 2011, regarding federal antifraud securities provisions and reporting 
requirements.106 The investors amended the complaint to add these disclosures, but the district 
court again dismissed.107 The court found that the plaintiffs failed to allege loss causation since 
“the Einhorn Presentation was based solely on publicly available information, and the SEC 
investigations indicated nothing more than a risk of accounting problems.”108  
On January 27, 2012, St. Joe announced that it would declare impairment of between 
$325 and $375 million in assets for the fourth quarter of 2011. 109 Plaintiffs then amended their 
complaint to add this information, which resulted in another dismissal. 110  The investors then 
appealed to the circuit court.111 
The court determined that the Einhorn Presentation did represent a corrective disclosure 
because it did not disclose any new information and was based solely on publicly available 
                                                 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Meyer v. Greene, 710 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 2013). 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 1193-94. 
109 Meyer v. Greene, 710 F.3d 1189, 1194 (11th Cir. 2013). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
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information.112 According to efficient market theory, the market price of a security reflects all 
publicly available information. 113  Additionally, “the mere repackaging of already-public 
information by an analyst or short-seller is simply insufficient to constitute a corrective 
disclosure.”114 The court also held that the SEC investigations were not enough to sustain a claim 
of loss causation since the SEC did not issue a finding—or indicate any allegations—of 
wrongdoing. The court determined that the sole initiation of an SEC investigation does not 
constitute a corrective disclosure.115 
2. In Re Bradley Pharmaceuticals (District of New Jersey) 
In Bradley, the plaintiffs, a class of common stock investors, filed a complaint alleging 
securities fraud against Bradley, a publicly-traded producer of over-the-counter and prescription 
pharmaceuticals.116 The plaintiffs alleged that Bradley made a $1 million “sham” sale of a cold 
drug, Deconamine, “to artificially inflate Bradley’s net income for the Third Quarter of 2004 ” 
without any expectation that consumers would keep the product.117   
Bradley disclosed the earnings from Deconamine in its Third Quarter Press Release on 
October 28, 2004.118 On February 28, 2005, the company issued a press release that the SEC was 
commencing “an informal inquiry relating to the Company to determine whether there have been 
violations of the federal securities laws.”119 Bradley’s stock price then immediately fell 26.4%.120  
                                                 
112 Meyer v. Greene, 710 F.3d 1189, 1198 (11th Cir. 2013). 
113 Id. at 1197(citing Thompson v. RelationServe Media, Inc., 610 F.3d 628, 691 (11th Cir. 2010)(Tjoflat, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
114 Id. at 1199. 
115 Id. at 1201. 
116 In re Bradley Pharms., Inc. Secs. Litig., 421 F. Supp. 2d 822, 824 (D.N.J. 2006). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 824-825. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
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The company released a restatement of earnings in April, 2005, which did no t result in any 
substantial change in share price.121  
The Bradley court rejected a “rigid and dogmatic, interpretation of Dura” in favor of 
“pragmatic understanding[.]”122 The court theorized that the plaintiffs must show that knowledge 
of the misrepresentation occurred before the drop in share price, but that the Dura opinion did 
not address “what type of events or disclosures may reveal the truth” or how specific the 
disclosure must be.123  
The Bradley court highlighted the Supreme Court’s statement in Dura, that “pleading 
rules are not meant to impose a great burden upon a plaintiff.”124 In re Bradley Pharms., Inc. 
Secs. Litig., 421 F. Supp. 2d 822, 829 (D.N.J. 2006)(quoting Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 
U.S. 336, 348, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 1634 (2005).  The court held that, since the investors alleged that 
Bradley’s stock price dropped after the alleged misrepresentations were revealed, this was 
sufficient to satisfy loss causation.  In re Bradley Pharms., Inc. Secs. Litig., 421 F. Supp. 2d 822, 
829 (D.N.J. 2006). 
3. In Re Gentiva (Eastern District of New York) 
Gentiva involved a home health provider that was paid in advance by Medicare via the 
home health prospective payments system (“HH PPS”). 125  The plaintiffs alleged that, in order to 
increase revenue, “Gentiva’s clinicians and managers were pressured by senior executives to 
provide patients with medically unnecessary visits and services in order to reach the enhanced 
                                                 
121 Id. 
122 In re Bradley Pharms., Inc. Secs. Litig., 421 F. Supp. 2d 822, 828 (D.N.J. 2006). 
123 Id. at 828. 
124 Id. at 829)(quoting Dura, 125 S.Ct. at 1634).   
125 In re Gentiva Secs. Litig., 932 F. Supp. 2d 352, 359 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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payment thresholds from Medicare.” 126  Gentiva employees effectively provided clients with 
more services than necessary in order to boost profits.127   
The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the company repeatedly represented in SEC filings 
and other public statements that Gentiva was "in compliance" with Medicare "standards and 
regulations".128 The plaintiff identified three “partial disclosures” by Gentiva: (1) announcements 
of the SFC and SEC investigations; (2) negative earnings releases; and (3) the SFC Report. 129 On 
May 13, 2010, the Wall Street Journal reported that the Senate Finance Committee began an 
“investigation into the practices of companies that provide in-home therapy visits reimbursed by 
Medicare, including Gentiva.”130 Gentiva’s stock then sank 7%.131 On July 1, 2010, the company 
issued a press release representing its active cooperation with the SFC, but that neither the SFC 
nor the SEC initiated a formal investigation.132 The stock then fell 11%.133 Gentiva disclosed the 
commencement of the SEC investigation on July 13, 2010.134  The stock price declined 9%.135   
The Gentiva court rejected the idea that a disclosure of an investigation, standing alone, is 
not a form of corrective disclosure.136  The court reasoned that the actual form of the factual 
allegations of fraudulent conduct is insignificant. 137 “The inherent veracity of the information is 
the paramount concern and the form that it takes it not as critical.”138The court found that the 
announcement of this investigation was enough to establish loss causation. “The announcement 
of a governmental investigation is the type of non-public new information that was not available 
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to the market, as opposed to something such as reports derived from a company's published 
financials. The court cannot conclude that this information was already reflected in the price of 
Gentiva's securities. In line with many district courts to have addressed this issue, the Court finds 
that the fact that Gentiva's stock price dropped after these announcements belies such a 
conclusion.”139The court ultimately dismissed the claim for failure to plead scienter, but this does 
not affect the court’s opinion on loss causation.140 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE LOOS DECISION  
In Loos, the court demanded that the market must react to fraud, rather than just the “poor 
financial health” of Immersion Corp. The quarterly reports indicated disappointing earnings, but 
not necessarily fraudulent accounting practices. 141 The court compared the Loos case to Daou, 
where the District Court determined that disappointing earnings were not sufficiently linked to 
an alleged accounting fraud.142  The Circuit Court reversed, citing a plausible connection.143 The 
court determined that $10 million in unbilled revenue was sufficient.144 Accordingly, the court 
determined the amounts and circumstances of Immersion were far less substantial than those in 
Daou.145 Therefore, the Loos court determined that the sufficient link in Daou was not apparent 
in the Loos facts. 146   However, the court does not create any reasoning as to why $10M is 
sufficient but over $3M is not.147, 148  
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The court asserted that an outright admission or finding of fraud is not necessary.  
However, evidence of a “risk” or “potential” for fraud is insufficient.149 The court pointed out 
that, when an investigation is announced, it is impossible to know what the investigation will 
“ultimately reveal.”150 Nonetheless, one could speculate as to the result of an investigation.  It is 
probable that an investigation is announced because there is a strong possibility of fraud.  
Nonetheless, the Court stated that such an announcement only puts investors on notice of 
potential fraudulent conduct.151 Any decline in share price is then a result of speculation and not 
whether fraud truly occurred.  The court stated that speculation should not be the “basis of a 
viable loss causation theory.”152 This logic is questionable though.  If the fraud is likely, then 
investors can expect share price to decline drastically.  If investors are unsure, the price may 
decline slightly.  If the investigation seems to be an unnecessary sham, investors will ignore the 
disclosure. 
A. Implications for Current and Future Investigations and Securities Fraud 
Claims 
Since the circuits are far from consistent on the issue of loss causation, pleading 
requirements for securities fraud will differ based on the circuit court.  Loos leaves open the 
possibility that other disclosures of investigations could be enough to fulfill the loss causation 
requirement.  “So, there could potentially be instances in which the announcement of an 
investigation occurs in a context different from that in Loos and in which plaintiffs press loss 
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causation arguments arising from the announcement of an investigation.”153 The holding in Loos 
does not qualify what types of investigations are sufficient to establish loss causation.  The 
holding is specific to the facts of Loos and leaves open the possibility that investigations with a 
stronger inference of fraud (whatever the requisite level required to establish a stronger inference 
may be) could fulfill loss causation. 
In a recent Fifth Circuit case, Amedisys, the court held that multiple disclosures are 
sufficient to establish loss causation.154  Amedisys, a publicly traded health services corporation, 
provided unnecessary medical visits in order to receive Medicare reimbursement. 155   The 
plaintiffs alleged that Amedisys revealed the fraud through five “partial” disclosures including 
(1) an analyst’s report on the fraud; (2) the resignation of two Amedisys executives; (3) a Wall 
Street Journal article regarding the fraud; (4) disclosure of government investigations; (5) poor 
quarterly earnings.156  The stock later declined by 60 percent.157  Although Amedisys argued that 
none of these disclosures, standing alone, would be sufficient to establish loss causation, the 
court held that the totality of these disclosures fulfilled loss causation.158 
 Professor Kaufman argues that the intentions of the PSLRA are often misinterpreted.159  
The causation required for a securities fraud claim in fraud-on-the-market cases is not of the 
kind adopted in Dura.160  The plaintiff is not required to prove that the defendant’s caused any 
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decline in the price of the stock, but that the defendant’s misrepresentation created a disparity or 
artificiality between the price of the stock and its actual value. 161  This intention is memorialized 
by the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs on May 17, 1994.162 
B. Implications for Corporations 
Due to the Loos decision, we now must figure out “when a company should announce the 
commencement of an internal investigation and what information should the announcement 
include.”163 Since the announcement of an investigation, standing alone, will not be enough to 
establish a securities fraud claim, directors are not disincentivized to prevent disclosure.  One 
could argue that this is a benefit to shareholders, because companies are not deterred from 
disclosing investigations, which may be pertinent to shareholders’ investment decisions.  
The Loos holding creates greater incentive for companies to announce investigations, since they 
will not automatically be subject to securities fraud suits.  This allows for more transparency in 
the marketplace.  Shareholders will be informed of occurrences within the company. 
By the same logic, though, one could argue that these announcements verify the fraud-
on-the-market cause of action as legitimate, since the stock price will reflect all the public 
information on the company.  Courts may be splitting hairs by arguing that an announcement of 
an investigation correlated with a dip in stock price does not inevitably assume the existence of 
fraud.  In reality, investors may be under the assumption that fraud either did occur or is a 
significant enough possibility that an investment in the company is considered too risky. 
                                                 
161 Id. 
162 Id. (citing Abandonment of the private right of action for aiding and abetting securities fraud/staff report on 
private securities litigation: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs, 103rd Cong. 228 (1994) (printed for the use of the committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs)). 
163 Peter Stone, Joshua Hamilton, et. al., Paul Hastings Discusses Ninth Circuit’s Decision on Loss Causation , THE 
CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Oct. 9, 2014, 8:26 AM), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2014/09/09/paul-hastings-
discusses-ninth-circuits-decision-on-loss-causation/. 
 21 
In any case, companies can manipulate their disclosures in order to prevent securities 
fraud litigation.  Before disclosing an event that could be considered fraud, corporate officials 
may disclose unrelated negative information that reduces the stock price. 164  Known as “walking 
down the stock price,” this behavior prevents the shareholder from being able to point to the 
alleged fraud as the cause of the stock price decline. 165   The corporation may also release 
positive news at the same time as the possibility fraudulent news, in order to offset the likelihood 
of a stock dip.166  Another technique is for the company to wait until market issues result in a 
stock price fall and only then disclose the fraudulent conduct. 167  These examples show that a 
corporation can use numerous techniques and devices to prevent a plaintiff from being able to 
sufficiently plead securities fraud. 
C. Implications for future Cases 
The Loos case is decided merely at the pleading stage.  Would it be more equitable to 
allow the claim to continue to discovery in order to find out whether fraud actually occurred? 
If we allow the claim to proceed, the effect of the ruling would essentially create another 
investigation alongside the internal, consulted, or SEC (or other agency) investigation.  Is it 
necessary to have two investigations of a company this early in the process?  Could this cause 
more problems for the company and its shareholders than the alleged fraud actually merits? 
The solution is to decide which allegations of fraud warrant further discovery and which 
are so attenuated as to be inadmissible at the pleading stage.  The Loos court determined that the 
facts of Immersion’s situation were insufficient to allow the case to continue. 
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There are still a significant number of questions that must be answered before evaluating 
the Loos decision: How often are investigations conducted on businesses? How often do these 
investigations reveal fraud?  What proportion of securities fraud goes undetected (probably 
impossible to determine)?  How reluctant are companies to initiate an internal investigation? (If 
they are very reluctant (and I would assume they probably are), then the disclosure of an 
investigation should be strong evidence of underlying fraud.) 
If we terminate a claim at the pleading stage, this may give more time for the company to 
cover up the fraud or articulate what occurred in a different fashion in order to not scare off 
investors.  The average time between a misstatement of fact and the truth being revealed to the 
market is 10.5 months.168  This also makes determining the amount of harm difficult, since there 
are many factors that could affect the stock price during this extended period.169  
If the announcement of an investigation is likely the result of some form of fraud, it may 
make sense to allow the case to proceed.  Court-ordered discovery would create a check on the 
internal investigation. 
Regarding the announcement of an investigation: “Everyone and their mother 
knows exactly what that means … [t]here was an investigation because there was fraud … 
[t]hat’s why the stock price tanks.  Because if an investigation was ‘just an investigation,’ no one 
would care, right?  But they do.  Know why?  Because people with money on the line are much, 
much, much smarter than people in black robes who might say ‘Oh, it's only an investigation, no 
actual fraud.’”170 Professor Martin argues that a more appropriate rule would be to look at the 
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stock price in the long term.171  If the stock drops after announcement of an investigation and 
continues to stay low, there is evidence of loss causation. 172  If the stock drops initially, but then 
ultimately rebounds, there is no loss causation.173  
Some scholars argue that one disclosure is only considered to be inaccurate after a later 
disclosure modifies or falsifies the previous one. 174  This view assumes that investors only see 
disclosed information as either true or false and are therefore speculating until a later disclosure 
proves their hypothesis.175  However, in reality, investors take a more nuanced approach and 
make an inference based on all the information they have gathered. 176  Investors then decided 
whether these facts influence the value of the company’s securities.177 
Perhaps the trier-of-fact should be responsible for deciding whether a loss is the result of 
the disclosure of fraud.178  It may be inequitable to have a court decide how a reasonable investor 
would behave while facing the same investment decision. 
Defending securities fraud is extremely expensive and often results in settlements to 
prevent a legal war of attrition from occurring. 179  The benefit of the Loos decision to companies 
is that they will not incur substantial legal fees unless there is considerable evidence of fraud.180  
The Loos decision may also be a reaction to the threat of frivolous suits by securities fraud 
litigators.181  
                                                 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 Ninth Circuit Misconstrues Loss Causation Requirement in Loos v. Immersion Corp. , SECURITIES DIARY (Oct. 9, 
2014, 7:10 PM), http://securitiesdiary.com/2014/09/16/ninth-circuit-misconstrues-loss-causation-requirement-in-
loos-v-immersion-corp/. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 818-19 (2009). 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
 24 
Since Loos seems to be fact-sensitive, what types of announcements revealing an internal 
investigation are sufficient to establish loss causation? 
There is, at least, one positive aspect of the Loos decision: cases will not be brought until 
an investigation is complete.  This will prevent early, speculative cases from flooding the courts 
until they are ripe with evidence of securities fraud.  The decision falls in line with the classic 
presumption that litigation should not overwhelm the court system.  Loos acts as a gatekeeper for 
securities fraud cases in the embryonic stage.  But this standard may cause corporations to wage 
a war of attrition by extending investigations as long as possible.  Loos goes too far and adds a 
requirement that prevents some securities fraud claims by plaintiffs who should be able to get 
past the pleading stage. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of loss causation is difficult to fulfill and likely 
inappropriate given the legislative history of the PSLRA.  The Ninth Circuit, as well as other 
federal courts, has strong reasons for requiring hardline loss causation standards.  The abuse of 
the securities fraud claim prior to the PSLRA cost corporations millions of dollars in legal fees.  
In order to prevent these frivolous suits, the legislature sought stricter requirements at the 
pleading stage.  Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit and others have gone to far in their analysis of the 
loss causation element.  The purpose of loss causation is to show that a disclosure caused a 
disparity between the stock price and the stock value.  The analysis ends there.  In Loos, the 
plaintiff should be able to pass the pleading stage by showing that the corrective disclosures 
revealed a difference in the stock price and the stock value.  This should not be a difficult 
requirement to overcome, given that Immersion Corp. falsified their revenue and did not uphold 
GAAP.  As the Supreme Court stated in Dura, “It should not prove burdensome for a plaintiff 
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who has suffered an economic loss to provide a defendant with some indication of the loss and 
the causal connection that the plaintiff has in mind.”182 
 The decision in Loos is incorrect in that it is naïve to assume that the “market cannot 
possibly know what the investigation will ultimately reveal.”183 If an investigation is necessary, 
then there is a strong assumption by investors that the va lue of the stock will decrease.  As the 
Gentiva court correctly asserted, the actual form of the factual allegations of fraudulent conduct 
is insignificant.184 It is the significance of the disclosure that is relevant.  This is, of course, 
relative to the impact of the investigation and the proportion of the corporation’s business it 
affects.  In a relatively small corporation like Immersion Corp., improper accounting practices 
can have an enormous effect on the value of the shares.  We assume that market price adequately 
reflects what investors perceive the value of the corporation to be.  If that is so, then the fact that 
an investigation is announced and the stock price dips should be enough to allow plaintiffs to 
allege loss causation in a securities fraud claim at the pleading stage. 
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